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Bequests and Social Security With
UncertainLifetimes
ABSTRACT
The fact that consumers do not know in advance the dates at which
theywill die effects their individual consumption and portfolio decisions.
In general, some consumers will end up leaving bequests at death, even if
they have no bequest motive, simply because they happen to die at a time
when they are holding wealth to provide for their ownfutureconsumption.
In the model of this paper,consumers who are otherwise identical, die
(randomly)at different ages and thus leavebequests of different sizesto
theirheirs. Therefore, there is intra—cohort variation in wealth and con-
sumption even if all consumers have the same labor income, taxes, and social
security benefits. This paper presents explicit steady state distributions
for consumption and wealth. The introduction of an actuarially fair social
security system reduces steady state private wealth by more than one—for—one
so that, even in a fully funded system, national wealth falls. In addition,
all central moments of the steady state distributions of consumption and





Cambridge, MA 02138Consumers do not, in general, know with certainty the date at which they
will die. An individual who has accumulated assets to provide for consumption
during retirement but then dies prematurely ends up leaving a larger bequest
to his heirs than he intended.In this paper we examine the implications of
uncertain lifetimes and the consequent "accidental" bequests for the saving—
consumption decisions of individuals and for aggregate consumption and sav-
ings. We extend the Modigliaui—Brumberg (1954) —Samuelson(1958) —Diamond
(1965) overlapping generations framework to take account of the fact that a
consumer's initial wealth depends on the mortality and bequest history of his
ancestors. The fact that the date of death and the size of bequest are random
leads to a non—degenerate distribution of wealth and consumption. Therefore,
in examining the effects of social security, for instance, we are able to
analyze the effects on the variance of consumption within each cohort as well
as the effects on the aggregate consumption of each cohort.
The effects of uncertain lifetime on individual consumption behavior were
first examined formally in a seminal paper by Yaari (1965). More recently
Fischer (1973), Barro and Friedman (1977), Levhari and Mirman (1977), Katz
(1979), Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Pelzman and Rousslang (1982) have used
Yaari's framework to examine various aspects of consumption and saving
behavior in the presence of uncertain lifetimes; however, all of these papers
focused on the consumption decision of an individual and ignored the effect of
uncerta).n lifetimes on the bequests received by subsequent generations.1 As we
will show at various points in this paper, changes in the economic environment
can have effects on aggregate behavior which differ dramatically from the
1. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) focus on the role of the family in providing
an (incomplete) annuities market but stop short of a full—scale
overlapping generations model in which the distribution of bequests is
determined endogenously.—2—
effects on individual behavior because of the endogenous adjustment of
bequests. For example, we show that if the net rate of return on capital is
equal to the population growth rate, then the introduction of actuarially fair
social security will raise the consumption of young consumers, if we hold ini-
tial wealth constant; however, allowing for the endogenous adjustment of
bequests, we find that in the long run aggregate consumption of the young
cohort is invariant to the presence or absence of actuarially fair social
security.
Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) have used an overlapping generations model
with uncertain lifetimes to examine the effects of social security and to
develop an optimal social security system. In their model, all consumers who
are born at the same date live exactly the same length of time. Thus there is
no intra—cohort variation in bequests, consumption or wealth. However, in the
model developed below, all consumers have the same probability of dying but
different members of the same generation die at different ages.It is this
tntra—cohort variation in the time of death which leads to non—degenerate dis-
tributions of bequests, wealth and consumption.
Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled (1983a) have developed an overlapping
generations model in which consumers with identical ox ante mortality proba-
bilities die at different ages.Since the Eckstein—Eichenbaum—Peled model,
which was developed independently of and virtually simultaneously with tbe
model presented below, is so similar tote oet here, itis worth commenting
on the diffices between the two models. First, asdmostimportantly, the
Eckstein—Eic..aum—Peled model has no capital althou8h one could interpret
that model as applying to an economy in which the net rate of return on capi-
tal is zero (i.e., a costless storage technology). However, as we show below,—3—
the effects of social security policy in a stationary economy differ dramati-
cally depending on whether or not the rate of return on capital zero. A
second difference between the two models concerns the generality of the
instantaneous utility function. In this paper, we assume that the instantane-
ous utility function displays hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) whereas
Eckstein, Eichenbaujn, and Peled use a more general concave utility function.
However, the formulation used by Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled is not as
general as it might first appear because they must at some point assume that
the concavity of the derived saving function is "not too large" (p. 16)
without presenting the implied restrictions on the utility function.An
advantage of the HARA utility function used here is that it leads to linear
decision rules thereby making the analysis easily tractable. A third differ-
ence between the models is that the model presented below allows for nonzero
rates of time preference and population growth whereas each of these rates is
assumed to be zero by Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled. Finally, the model
presented below is used to analyze the effects of actuarially fair social
security whereas Eckstein, Eichenbanm and Peled mention the effects of social
security only in the presence of a well—functioning annuity market, in which
case social security has no effect, as pointed out later in this paper.2
A major finding of this paper is that actuarially fair socialsecurity
reduces private wealth by more than 100%.That is, the introduction of
actuarially fair social security leads to a reduction in total national
2. In a different paper, Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1983b) examine the
effects of social security in the presence of heterogeneous mortality
probabilities. However, in that paper, there are private annuity markets
so that individuals without explicit bequest motives hold all of their
savings in the form of annuities. Thus,thereare no bequests in that
model. The structure of that model is quite different from the structure
of the model presented below in this paper or the model in Eckstein,
Eichenbaum, and Peled (1983a).—4—
wealth, even if the social security system is fully funded. If the net rate
of return on capital is equal to the population growth rate, then this reduc-
tion in national wealth does not reduce steady state sustainable consumption;
the aggregate consumption of the young cohort and the aggregate consumption of
the old cohort are each invariant to the introduction of actuarially fair
social security in this case.However, if the rate of return on capital
exceeds the population growth rate, then the reduction in national wealth
reduces aggregate sustainable consumption; in this case, the aggregate con-
sumption of the young cohort and the aggregate consumption of the old cohort
are each reduced by the introduction of social security. A second major find-
ing is that an increase in the level of actuarially fair social security will
uniformly narrow the distributions of consumption and bequests; all central
moments of the distributions of consumption and bequests will be reduced.
A consumer's claim to social security benefits can be viewed as an
annuity.If the consumer survives until retirement, the annuity pays some
specified amount, but if the consumer dies before retirement, the annuity pays
zero. Under an actuarially fair social security system, the price that the
consumer pays for this annuity (i.e., the social security tax levied on young
consumers) is equal to the expected present value of future payoffs. However,
consumers would be willing to pay more than the expected present value of
future payoffs because the payoffs are positively correlated with future mar-
ginal utility of consumption. The annuity has a positive payoff if and only
if the consumer survives, thereby having a positive marginal utility of con—
sumption the annuity has a zero payoff if the consumer dies, in which case
wealth has zero marginal utility. Therefore, an actuarially fair increase in
the level of social security taxes and benefits will make a young consumer—5—
wealthier and hence increase his consumption. Since an increase in the social
security tax levied on a young consumer will decrease his disposable income by
the amount of the tax and will increase his consumption, it is clear that the
saving of the young consumer will be reduced by an amount larger than the tax
increase.
The description in the paragraph above is partial equilibrium in nature
in that it ignores the effects on bequests and on consumption and savings
behavior of subsequent young consumers.3 To the eztent that private saving of
young consumers is reduced by a permanent increase in the level of social
security taxes and benefits, there will be a reduction in bequests received by
subsequent generations. In our model, bequests are received at the beginning
of a consumer's life so that the reduction in bequests leads to a reduction in
the initial wealth of subsequent young consumers. The effect of this reduc-
tion in initial wealth is to mitigate or even reverse the increase inconsump-
tion of subsequent young consumers; on the other hand, the effect of reduced
initial wealth would tend to reinforce the reduction in saving of subsequent
young consumers.Since in our model, the private capital stock is equal to
the savings of the young consumers, an actuarially fair permanent increase in
social security taxes will reduce the long—run private capital stock bymore
than one—for—one.
In section I we develop a simple model of individual consumption behavior
in the presence of an uncertain lifetime. We assume that consumersare self-
ish in the sense that they derive no utility from the consumption orutility
of their children.4 In section II we explicitly take account of the fact that
3. Hubbard (1983) also provides a partial equilibriumanalysis in which young
consumers increase their consumption in response to the introduction of
actuarially fair social security.—6--
the unconsumed wealth held by a consumer at the time of his death is passed on
to his children. We calculate the steady state distributions of consumption
of the young, consumption of the old, and private wealth. Actuarially fair
social security is analyzed in section III where we show that national wealth
is reduced by the introduction of (fully funded) social security. In addition
to analyzing the effects on aggregate consumption of each cohort, we show that
the introduction of social security uniformly narrows the steady state distri—
bution of consumption of each cohort. The analysis in section III is confined
to steady states, and in section IV we examine behavior along the transition
path to the new steady state. It should be noted that social security has an
effect in this model only because there is no private market for actuarially
fair annuities which would enable consumers effectively to offset the social
security system. In section V we examine the effects of the introduction of a
private market for actuarially fair annuities. Section VI contains a diagram-
matic presentation of many of the results of the paper. Concluding remarks
are presented in section VII.
I. Individual Consumption Behavior Under Uncertain Lifetime
Consider an economy with many consumers and a single commodity. This
commodity can be either consumed or invested. If one unit of the commodity is
invested, it yields R units of the commodity in the following period. Each
consumer lives either one period or two periods. A consumer works during the
first period of his life earning a fixed labor income Y. Also in the first
4. Fischer (1973) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) model consumers as deriving
utility from leaving a bequest. This utility is a function of the size of
the bequest. Barro (1974) and Drazen (1978), in models without lifetime
uncertainty, assume that consumers derive utility from the utility of
their children.—7—
period of his life, a consumer consumes an amount c1 and pays a tax T. At the
end of the first period of his life, the consumer has G .￿. 1 children. There
is a probability p that the consumer dies at the end of his first period of
life5 (after having the children). If the consumer survives to the second
period of life, he does not work but receives a social security payment S. He
then consumes an amount c2. When a consumer dies (either at the end of period
one or period two), any unconsumed wealth is divided equally among his chil-
dren.
Each consumer in the economy chooses c1 andc2 to maximize the following
utility function
U(c1) +(1—p)6U(c2) (1)
where 0 < & .￿. 1 is the inverse of one plus the rate of time preference. This
utility function is based on the uncertain lifetime literature in which the
discounted utility index for period j is multiplied by the probability of
being alive in period j. This formulation is simply the expected value of a
state—contingent utility function in which U(c) is the utility index con-
tingent on being alive at age j, and the utility index is identically zero.
contingent on not being alive at age j.6 Note that according to the utility
function in (1), consumers do not care about their children; they derive no
utility from leaving bequests.
5. Although individual consumers face uncertainty about their date of death,
there is no aggregate uncertainty; a fraction p of the consumers in each
generation dies at the end of the first period of life.
6. It is not necessary that the utility index is equal to zero in the case of
death. All that is required is that utility in the state of death does
not depend on the level of wealth.—8—
Up to this point it may appear that all consumers are identical:they
have identical utility functions, labor income Y, taxes T, childbearing
characteristics, probabilities of survival, and, if they survive, identical
social security benefits S. However, different consumers receive bequests of
different sizes depending on the mortality history of the earlier generations
of their families. Let B be the bequest a consumer receives from his parent
when he is born.7 For the moment we take B as given; we will discuss the
determination of B later in the paper.
Finally we define W to be the wealth of a consumer at the end of the
first period of his life,
W=B+Y—T—c1 (2)
If a consumer dies at the end of his first period of life, each of his chil-
dren receives RW/G as a bequest at the beginning of the following period. If
the consumer survives into the second period, he consumes c2 =RW+S,because
he derives no utility from leaving a bequest. That is, if the consumer sur-
vives into a second period of life, his second—period consumption is
c2 =RIB+Y—T—
c1]+S (3)
We can now solve a consumer's first—period consumption decision. Maxim-





7. If a parent dies after the first period of his life, his child receives a
bequest B at the beginning of the first period of the child's life. If a
parent lives 2 periods, then as shown below, the child receives no bequest
in either period; in this case, of course, the bequest received at birth
by the child is zero.—9—
In general1 if U( ) is concave, then the optimal first—period consumption is a
decreasing function of (l—p)R6 and an increasing function of REB +Y—TI+S.
We will restrict the utility index U(c) to be a member of the HARA family
(hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) so that the optimal value ofc1 is a
linear function of R(B +Y—TI+S,as shown below. A general specification
of the HARA class of utility functions is
U(c)i(_D.Q_ +n)1 (5) yl—y
subject to the following restrictions: y # 1;> 0; j- +i >0; i= 1if
=—. TheHARA family of utility functions includes the following special
cases:(1) constant relative risk aversion (i= 0),which includes loga-
rithmic utility if y =0;(2) constant absolute risk aversion (y =+);and
(3) quadratic utility (y =2).Differentiating (5)withrespect to c yields
U'(c) (j- +n) sothat the first—order condition in (4) can be written
as
—1 (R(B+Y—T—c1] +S)
1 + = (l—p)R8[
1
+qI' (6)
Equation (6) can be rearranged to yield the following linear consumption func—
t ion





Theconsumptionfunction in (7) is particularly simple in the case in
which Il(c) has constant relative risk aversion (n= 0).In this case, since
b =0,first—period consumption is proportional to the value of disposable
lifetime resources REB +Y—T]+S.Let u 1—y be the (constant)— 10—
coefficientof relative risk aversion. Note that if R =5=1(i.e., zero
time preference and zero net rate of return on capital), then the fraction of
total disposable resources (B +Y—T+S)consumed in the first period of
life is a =(1+(1—p)']1.The greater the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, the smaller the fraction of disposable resources consumed in the
first period.In the limit as a —4 ,aconsumer would consume 1/2 of
disposable resources in the first period. On the other hand, in the limit as
a —+0,the consumer would consume all of his disposable resources in the
first period.8
Using the consumption function (7), we can easily calculate the end—of—
first—period wealth and the second—period consumption of the consumer. Combin-
ing equations (2) and (7) yields
W =(1—aR)(B+Y—T)—aS—b (8)
and combining equations (3) and (7) yields
1—aR b
c2 =ac1 — (9)
Accordingto (9), the income expansion path relating c1 and c2 is linear and
positively sloped. (From (7), a > 0 and aR ( 1.) This relation will be use-
ful later when we examine the intra—cohort distributions of c1 and c2.
II. Intergenerational Transfers
We have solved the consumer's saving—consumption decision conditional on
8. If the consumer cannot borrow against his (uncertain) future social
security benefit S, then c1 —4 B +Y—Tas a —4 0. Of course, if S =0,
then the consumer will indeed consumer all of his disposable lifetime
resources in the first period.— 11—
thebequest B received at birth. In this section, we calculate the bequests
received by each consumer. The bequest received by a consumer depends on the
mortality history of the earlier generations of his family. Specifically, let
j be the number of consecutive previous generations in a consumer's family
which died at age 1. For example, j0 indicates that the consumer's parent
lived 2 periods and therefore left no bequest to the consumers If j =1,then
the consumer's parent died at age 1 leaving a bequest but the consumer's
grandparent lived 2 periods leaving no bequest. We index all consumers
according to j and observe that for a consumer drawn at random, the probabil-
ity that he is of type j is p3(1—p).
Let the superscript j indicate that a variable pertains to a consumer of
type j. We will first examine type 0 consumers and then we will examine type
j consumers for j > 1. As indicated above, B0 =0.The first—period con-
sumption and end—of—first—period wealth of type 0 consumers follow immediately
from (7) and (8), respectively,
=a(R[Y—T]+S)+b (10)
=(1—aR)(Y—T)—aS—b. (11)
Note that the sum of c° and W° is equal to after—tax labor income Y—T.9
For consumers of type j, j > 1, consumption and saving behavior depend on
the initial bequest, received at birth. From (7) and (10), we obtain
= +0)
(12)
9.We assume that S and T are s1Jl enough and that the utility function and
labor income are such that W > 0. Note th)if b =0(as it would be
with constant relative risk aversion), then W > 0 provided that S and T
are small enough.— 12—
andfrom (8) and (11), we obtain
=(1—aR)B+ (13)
In general1 if a type j—1 consumer dies after one period, he leaves a bequest
of G'W1 to each of his children (who are type j consumers). The bequest
earns a gross rate of return K so that
=(R/G)W (14)
where, by convention, W1 0.Substituting (14) into (13) yields the
first—order linear constant coefficient difference equation
=(1—aR)(R/G)W1 +W0 j =0,1,2,... (15)
which has the solution
=W°I (1—aR) 3(R/G)' j =0,1,2,... (16)
1=0
According to (16), WL1) is an increasing function of 3.That is, as we
increase the number of previous generations which died early and thus left
bequests, we increase We will assume that (1—aR)R < G)° Therefore,
(0)
(j) _________ . .
W approaches 1—1—aRR/G as japproachesinfinity.
We have now completely solved the model. Given any nonnegative integer 3
we know that a fraction (1—p)p of the population is of type j. Then using
equations (10)—(12), (14), and (16) it is a simple matter to calculate the
1
10. Observe from (7b) that (1—aR)R =R/(ø+R)where 0((1—p)R6]' > 0.
Thus, if 0 .G,then (1—aR)R ( G.It can be shown that if
(0—G)(R—G) < G2, then (1—aR)R < G. Thus, if 0 > G and K j G, then (1—aR)R
< G.— 13—
consumption,wealth, and bequests received at birth by each type j consumer.
Our next step is to summarize the distributions of consumption, wealth and
bequests by calculating the values of aggregate first—period consumption, C1',
aggregate second—period consumption, C2*, aggregate private wealth W', and
aggregate bequests, B'. Each of these aggregates is expressed on a per capita
basis (more precisely, per person in the young generation). For example,
aggregate private wealth per capita is defined as
=I(1—p)pW (17)
j =0
Calculating the aggregate per capita values of both sides of (13) we
obtain
=(1—aR)B'+ (18)
The aggregate per capita level of bequests received at birth is calculated by
recalling that a fraction p of each type of consumer dies early leaving a
bequest. Thus the aggregate wealth held by consumers who die young is pW'.
Including the accrued interest on this wealth and adjusting for the fact that
each generation has G times as many consumers as the previous generation, we
obtain
B' =p(R/G)W' (19)
Substituting (19) into (18) yields
(0)
= (20) 1 —(1—aR)pR/G
Therefore, average per capita wealth is proportional to the wealth of
type 0 consumers.— 14—
Inorder to calculate the aggregate per capita value of first—period con-
sumption, we observe from equation (2) that
C=Y_T+B*_W* (21)
Substituting (19) into (21) yields
=Y—T—(1—pR/G)W* (22)
Eefore calculating per capita aggregate second—period consumption, recall
that our per capita aggregates are calculated as per person in the young
cohort. Since only a fraction (l—p) of young consumers survives to the second
period of life, and since each generation is only G' times as large as the
succeeding generation, C (1—p)G I(1—p)pc.From the fact that
j=0
= +Swe easily obtain
=(1_p)G(RW*+S) (23)
To calculate aggregate economy—wide consumption per capita add together
(22) and (23) to obtain
C + = Y—T+(1—p)GS+(RIG—1)? (24)
Observe from (24) that aggregate private consumption per capita is equal to
the sum of after—tax labor income, Y—T, plus social security payments to the
surviving fraction (l—p) of the old cohort, plus the net return on wealth,
adjusted for population growth.
A final useful relationship between C and C is obtained by calculating
the aggregate per capita values of both sides of the income expansion path in
(9) to obtain— 15—
= 1_-aR*—k (25) 2 a1 a
Thus,theaggregate income expansion path relating Cand Cis linear and
positively sloped. Thus, in analyzing the steady state effects of changes in
the social security parameters S and T, we know from (25) that C and C both
move in the same direction.
III. The Effects of Actuarially Fair Social Security
In this section we consider the effects on savings and consumption of the
introduction of a fully funded actuarially fair social security system. We
suppose that the only role of the government is to collect social security
taxes from the young and to distribute social security benefits to the old.
Thus the taxes T levied on the young are social security taxes. An actuari-
ally fair social security system would levy a tax of (1—p)R dollars for each
dollar of benefits promised, i.e., RT =(1—p)S.Under this system, a consumer
contributes (1—p)RS to the social security system. Be receives S if he sur-
vives to the second period of life but receives zero if he dies after one
period. Thus the expected present value of the social security benefit is
(1—p)RS which is equal to the consumer's contribution. Put differently. the
social security system runs a balanced account vis—a—vis each generation. The
social security system collects taxes from the members of each generation when
they are young, invests the tax revenue at a gross rate of return R, and then
returns all of the tax revenue with accrued interest to the surviving old
members of the generation.
lilA. ]Effects Social Security Aggregate Consumption and Aggregate
Capital Accumulation— 16—
Inorder to study the effects of actuarially fair social security on
aggregate consumption, we proceed in three steps.First, we analyze the
effects of social security on the saving and consumption behavior of type 0
consumers. Then, we use our results about the effects on to analyze the
effects on the private capital stock and on the total national capital stock.
Finally, we use the relations between the national capital stock and aggregate
consumption to determine the effects on C and C2.
To calculate the effects of actuarially fair social security on consump-
tion and saving of young type 0 consumers, we substitute T =(1—p)RSinto
(10) and (11) to obtain
c0 =aRY+b+apS (26)
=(1—aR)Y—b—T—apS (27)
The introduction of actuarially fair social security increases the future
value of lifetime resources, R(B +Y—T) +S,by —RT +S=pS.A consumer who
survives to the second period receives a social security payment S which
exceeds the value of his contribution with accrued interest, RT, because the
surviving members of each generation receive (on a pro rata basis) the taxes—
cwn—interest contributed by members of their generation who died after one
period. The effect of this increase in lifetime resources is to increase c0
by apS. The wealth held at the end of the first period by type 0 consumers is
reduced for two reasons: first, disposable resources available in the first
period fall by the amount of the tax T. second, the increase in first—period
consumption further reduces wealth held at the end of the first period.
In a fully funded social security system, the total national capital
stock per capita (measured at the end of a period) is equal to the sum of the— 17—
aggregateprivate capital stock per capita, W, and the per capita capital
stock held by the social security system T. Recall from equation (20), that
the private capital stock, W, is proportional to and that the constant
of proportionality does not depend on the parameters of the social security
system. Since, from (27), the introduction of social security reduces
it is clear that the aggregate private capital stock is reduced by the intro-
duction of social security. Since B* =(pR/G)W*,the reduction in the aggre-
gate private capital stock implies an equiproportionate reduction in aggregate
bequests per capita.
The effect of actuarially fair social security on the aggregate national
capital stock per capita, W* +T,is easily determined by first observing from
the definition of end—of—first--period wealth in (2) that
W*+T=Y+B*_C (28)
Then calculating the aggregate per capita values of both sides of (12) we
obtain
c1= aEB*+ (29)
Substituting (29) into (28) yields
W* +T=Y+(1—aR)B— (30)
Since we have already shown that the introduction of social security causes B*
to fall and to increase, it is clear from (30) that the aggregate
national capital stock W* +Tis reduced by the introduction of social secu-
rity.
Next we examine the effects on aggregate consumption of the introduction— 18—
ofactuarially fair social security. Substituting RT for (1—p)S in (24) gives
an expression for aggregate economy—wide consumption per capita
C +C=Y+((RIG)—l)(W+T) (31)
Aggregate private consumption is equal to the sum of labor income Y and the
net return (adjusted for population growth) on national wealth. Observe that
if R=G, so that the net rate of return on capital is equal to the rate of
population growth, then the coefficient on national wealth in (31) is zero.
In this case, C +Cis independent of the level of actuarially fair social
security taxes and benefits. Furthermore, in view of the aggregate income
expansion path in (26), both C and C are independent of the level of
actuarially fair social security taxes and benefits when R =G.If R > G,
then the reduction in aggregate wealth, W +T,induced by the introduction of
social security leads to a reduction in C +C;in light of (25), C and C
are each reduced by the introduction of actuarially fair social security.
* *
Finally,if R < G, then C1 and C2 are each increased by the introduction of
actuarially fair social security.
III.B. The Effects of Social Security Intra—Cohort Distribution of
Consumut ion.
Raving analyzed the effects of social security on the aggregate consump-
tion of the young cohort and the aggregate consumption of the old cohort, we
now examine the intra—cohort distributions of consumption and wealth. We have
already shown (equation (26)) that the first—period consumption of type 0 con—
sumers increases by apS in response to the introduction of social security.
Also we have shown that falls by T +apSwhen social security is intro—— 19—
duced.As a consequence of the fall in there is a reduction in
bequests, BU), received at birth by type 1 consumers. Indeed, the introduc—
tion of social security reduces for all type j consumers for j =
1,2,3 This result follows from the facts that is proportional to
(see equations (14) and (16)) and that W0 is reduced by the introduc-
tion of social security. Taking account of the induced reduction in bequests,
we analyze the intra—cohort distribution of consumption.
The deviation of a type j consumer's first—period consumption from the
average level of first—period consumption is easily calculated by subtracting
(29) from (12) to obtain
c' —C1*
=aR(B—BC) (32)
Thus, the deviation of c' from the average consumption of the young cohort
is proportional to deviation of from the average bequest B. Using equa-
tions (14), (16) and (20), equation (32) can be rewritten as'1
c0 — = a(R2/G)W)(•I0(1_aR)1(R/G)1
—
1—p(RIG)(1—aR)
Since the introduction of actuarially fair social security reduces it is
clear from (33) that the (magnitude of the) deviation of type j consumer's
first—period consumption from the average first—period consumption is reduced
by the introduction of social security. Thus, the distribution is narrowed by
the introduction of social security. More precisely, all central moments of
the intra—cohort distribution of are reduced by the introduction of
social security.
i—i
11. We use the convention that (1—aR) 1(R/G)' is equal to zero for j =0.
i=0— 20—
Theeffects of the introduction of social security on second—period con-
sumption are easily calculated by observing from (9) that c' can be
expressed as an increasing linear function of Therefore, the narrowing
of the distribution of implies that the distribution of is also nar-
rowed by the introduction of social security.
For the case in which R =G,it is straightforward to analyze the (steady
state) welfare implications of the introduction of social security. In this
case, the introduction of actuarially fair social security does not affect the
average levels of consumption of the young or of the old as explained in sec-
tion III.A.However, it narrows the distribution of consumption of each
cohort. Therefore, if each consumer has an identical utility function and
receives equal weight in the social welfare function, the introduction of
social security is welfare—improving.If R < G, then the introduction of
security raises the average level of consumption and reduces the variance of
consumption. Each of these effects increases social welfare. However, if R >
G, then the introduction of social security reduces average consumption, which
tends to reduce welfare, but also reduces the intra—cohort variance of con-
sumption, which tends to raise welfare.
IV. The Transition Path to the New Steady State
In section III we examined the effects on consumption and wealth of the
introduction of actuarially fair social security. However, the comparison of
regimes with and without social security was actually a comparison of steady
states. In particular, we assumed that the social security system had been in
effect long enough so that essentially no one received a bequest that included
part of the savings of an ancestor who lived in the initial regime without— 21—
socialsecurity. Equivalently, we assumed that each person had at least one
ancestor who lived for two periods under the new regime, leaving no bequests
and thus severing links to the old regime.
In this section we examine the transition path to the new steady state
which accompanies the introduction of an actuarially fair social security sys-
tem. We show that the introduction of social security reduces the intra—
cohort variances of first—period consumption and second—period consumption for
every generatIon (except the first) born under the new social security regime.
Also, if R ￿.G,then the average levels of first—period consumption and
second—period consumption of each generation are at least as high under the
social security regime as in the absence of social security. In this case.
the introduction of social security increases the welfare of every generation
born under the social security regime.
Suppose that actuarially fair fully funded social security is introduced
at the beginning of period t*+1. We will assume that since the older cohort
(born at time t*) did not contribute to the social security system they
receive no benefits.The young generation pays a tax T =(1—p)1(Sand the
survivors will each receive a social security payment of S as discussed in
section III. In order to analyze the transition path to the new steady state
we introduce the following notational conventions:(1) a double tilda over a
variable denotes the value of that variable under the social security system;
a single tilda denotes the value that the variable would have had without the
introduction of social security; (2) the subscript t*+m denotes that the vari-
able pertains to a consumer born at the beginning of period t+m; without a
time subscript, the variable refers to the steady—state value of the variable
(i.e., m =co). Thus,for instance, is the first—period consumption,— 22—
undera social security regime, of consumers of type j born at the beginning
of period t5+m.
The effect of social security on the first—period consumption of consu-
mers of type j born at the beginning of period t*+m is easily obtained from
(12) and (14),
(j) —(j) =(O)(O) + —(j—1)j=0,1,2,...




where we use the convention that 1) =1)=0.We also note that if m = t*+m t*+m
1, then (j—1) —(j—1)=0because the wealth of the generation born at
t*+m_1 t*+m._1
time t is unchanged by the introduction of social security. Observe from
(26) that
O) —(O)=apS (35)
Therefore, the introduction of social security increases by apS the first—
period consumption of every consumer born at time t*+1. Also, from (9), the
second—period consumption of each surviving member of this cohort is increased
by (1—aR)pS. Thus, the first generation born under the new social security
regime is made unambiguously better off. The bequests received by each indivi-
dual in this cohort are invariant to the introduction of social security, and
for a given level of bequests, the introduction of social security increases
the consumption possibilities of each consumer.
Now we examine the consumption and wealth of generations born after
period t+1. A straightforward generalization of (16) yields— 23—
= I(l—aR)'(R/G)'W2j (36)
where W0 .isthe end—of—first—period wealth of consumers born in period t*+m_1
t*+m_i.Sincethe social security system first goes into effect in period
t+l, it follows from (27) that
—(T+apS),for i =0,1,2,...,m—l
—(0) — (37) t+m—i t+m—i
—
0 ,fori =m,m+l,m-f2,...





where j*min(j, rn—i) (38b)






where we use the convention that I (l—aR)'(R/G)' =0.Observe from (39) that
i=0
for any given m, —*+rnis non—increasing in j.Moreover, for
j =1,...,rn—i, the effect on first—period consumption of the introduction of
social security is strictly decreasing in j.
We will now show that the introduction of actuarially fair social secu-
rity reduces the intra—cohort variance of consumption of each generation
(except the first) born under the social security regime. We first record— 24—
threeobservations:
> j =1,2,3,...
(ii) > j =1,2,3,...
fl_I (iii)C'' — <c'j' — —, — 12 2
1,t*+m 1,t*+m —1,t*+m 1,t*+m.' '.'." withstrict inequality
for some j if m2.
Observation (i), which follows from (12), (14), and (16), simply states that
for a given cohort, first—period consumption is increasing in j in the absence
of social security. Observation (ii), which follows from (12), (14), and (36)
states that for a given cohort born under the social security regime, first—
period consumption is increasing inj. Observation (iii), which follows from
(39), states the effect on first—period consumption of the introduction of
social security is non—increasing in j, and is strictly decreasing for some j,
if m ￿ 2. According to the lemma below, these three observations imply that
the intra—cohort variance of i) is less than the intra—cohort variance of 1, t+m
(j)
1, t*+m
LEMMA. Consider thediscrete random variables xandyandlet
f =prob(x =x)=prob(y i' i0,1,2.... Suppose that ￿ 'ii i =
1,2,3,...,and
Yj
>y_1, j =1,2,3,...,with strict inequality for some i
and some j.Suppose also that — — withstrict inequality
for some i. Then Var (y) ( Var (x).— 25 —
Proof.See Appendix A.
We have shown that the introduction of actuarially fair social security
does not affect the intra—cohort variance of first—period consumption of the
first generation born under the social security regime; however, it does
reduce the intra—cohort variation of first—period consumption of each subse-
quent generation. Since the second—period consumption of each consumer is a
linear function of first—period consumption (equation (9)), it follows that
the introduction of social security does not reduce the intra—cohort variance
of second—period consumption of the first generation born under the social
security regime but does reduce this intra—cohort variance for all subsequent
generations.
We have derived unambiguous results about the intra—cohort variance of
consumption along the transition path to the new steady state. The effects on
the average level of consumption are less clear—cut. We have already shown
that for the generation born at the beginning of period t+1, the average lev-
els of first—period consumption and second—period consumption are increased by
the introduction of social security. Also, we have shown that in the new
steady state, the average levels of and decrease, increase, or
remain unchanged depending on whether R is greater than, less than, or equal
to G. Letting ,t+m denote the average value of *+m and denote
the average value of we will show that ,t+m —,t*+m
decreases as
m increases. The reason is that as m increases (i.e., as we increase the
length of time for which the social security regime has been in effect), there
is a decrease in the amount of bequests which represent accumulated saving
from generations born before the introduction of social security, when private
saving was higher.— 26—
Theeffect of social security on the average first—period consumption of
the generation born at the beginning of period t+m is calculated in Appendix
B and is equal to
C1t*+m —Cit*+mlp(R/G)(laR)Rl' +[1_p(l_aR)](k/G)mpm(1_aR)i.)
(40)
Since we have assumed that (l—aR)pR is less than G, it is clear from (40) that
—,t*+m
decreases as m increases, as claimed above.
In the case in which R =G,equation (40) implies that t*+m —
isequal to aSpm(1_aR)m which is positive for all finite a. Thus, since the
introduction of social security increases the average value and reduces the
variance of for all finite m, it also (see equation (9)) increases the
average value and reduces the variance of CJ*+m for all finite a. There-
fore, if R =G,the introduction of social security is welfare—improving for
every generation born under the new social security regime. More generally,
if R j G, the welfare of every generation (except the current old generation
which is unaffected) is improved by the introduction of social security.
The welfare effects of the introduction of social security are less
clear—cut in the case in which R > G. Clearly, the welfare of the generation
born at time t+l is improved because, as explained earlier, the first—period
consumption of every consumer in this generation increases by apS (and from
equation (9), second—period consumption increases by (1—aR)pS). For all gen-
erations born after time t*+l, the introduction of social security reduces the
intra—cohort variance of consumption. For sufficiently small m, it follows— 27—
from(40) that the average level of first—period (and second—period) consump-
tion is increased by the introduction of social security. Thus, for these
generations, welfare is increased. The difficulty in our welfare analysis
arises for generations born long after t*+l.If R > G, then it follows
immediately from (40) that fOr sufficiently large m, the average first—period
(and a fortiorj average second—period) consumption of the generation born at
time t*+rn is reduced by the introduction of social security. The effect on
the welfare of this generation thus depends on whether the welfare—improving
effects of reduced variance dominate the welfare—worsening effects of reduced
average consumption.
V. Private Annuities
We have examined the effects of actuarially fair social security in which
the amount of this annuity held by each individual is determined by the
government rather than by the individual. Implicit in this analysis was the
assumption that there is no market for private annuities. In this section we
will introduce a market for private annuities in which individuals can choose
the level of annuities purchased. Because actuarially fair social security is
a perfect substitute for actuarially fair private annuities, the introduction
of social security has no effect on an economy in which there is already a
private annuity market. Thus, we will not consider social security in this
section. Rather we will simply focus on the effects of introducing actuari-
ally fair annuities into an economy in which there is no social security.
With the introduction of private annuities, there are now two alternative
forms in which a consumer can hold his wealth. As before, he can hold capital
directly, earning a gross rate of return R. Alternatively, he can deposit his— 28—
savingsat an annuity company.The annuity company operates by accepting
deposits from young consumers and using these deposits to buy capital which
earns a gross rate of return R. At the beginning of the following period, the
annuity company distributes its holdings (with accumulated interest) to its
surviving depositors in proportion to their initial deposits. Thus, each sur-
viving depositor at the annuity company receives A = dollarsfor each dol-
lar initially deposited. As shown by Yaari (1965), consumers who do not have
explicit bequest motives will choose to hold all of their wealth in the form
of these annuities. Thus, there will be no bequests.
The effect of introducing actuarially fair private annuities is to raise
the (gross) rate of return on saving from R to A =RJ(l—p).For any given
individual, the response to an increased rate of return is to increase
second—period consumption. However, the effect on first—period consumption is
ambiguous because of the usual conflict of income and substitution effects.
We will demonstrate in this section that if R =&=G=1(so that
A =(1—pY'),then despite the ambiguity at the individual level, the effect
on aggregate first—period consumption is unambiguous.In particular, the
introduction of actuarially fair private annuities will reduce aggregate con-
sumption of the young and raise aggregate consumption of the old.
Consumers can, by holding annuities, earn a gross rate of return A on





12. Since there are no bequests, there is no need to distinguish consumers
according to the mortality history of their families.— 29—
Thefirst—ordercondition for this problem is
IJ'(c1) =(1—p)AÔU'(A(Y—c1)) (42)
With actuarially fair annuities (1—p)A =R.Therefore, since c2 =A(Y—c1),
equation (42) can be rewritten as
U'(1) =R8U'(2) (43)
where we use a circumflex to denote the value of a variable in thepresence of
a private annuity market. Observe that if U( )exhibitsconstant relative
risk aversion (TI= 0;a 1 —y> 0), then (43) implies that (1/2Y=
whereasequation (4) implies that in the absence of private annuities,
=(1—p)R6for all j. Therefore, it follows that, with constant
relative risk aversion, the introduction of private annuities reduces the
share of aggregate consumption consumed by the young cohort.
For the remainder of this section we assume that G =R=&=1,i.e.,
that the rate of population growth, the net rate of return on capital and the
rate of time preference are all equal to zero. With R& =1,(43) implies that
=forany strictly concave utility function U( ).Since 02 =A(Y—1)




In order to calculate aggregate consumption in the absence of annuities, we— 30—
observefrom (4) that when R =6=1,
=(l—p)U'(4J)
(45)
Since i—p is less than one, it follows that for any concave utility function
U( ),
4j) > 3 =0,1,2,... (46)






C2* < (i—p)C1' (47)
We can now compare steady state consumption of each cohort with and
without private annuities. Because R =G=1,steady state aggregate consump-
tion is not affectedby thepresenceofprivate annuities:
C1* + = Y= + 2*. However,from (44a,b) and (47) we see that the
older generation consumes a smaller fraction of total output in the absence of
annuities than in the presence of annuities. That is, the introduction of
actuarially fair annuities will reduce the aggregate consumption of the young
and increase the aggregate consumption of the old. This finding is unambigu-
ous despite the fact that for any individual with given initial endowments,
the effect on first—period consumption is ambiguous. As will be explained in
the next section, the income and substitution effects on first—period consump-
tion work in opposite directions for an individual; however, at the aggregate
level, there is no income effect (when R =G)so that the substitution effect
dominates.— 31—
Finally,we examine the effect of the introduction of annuities on
private wealth. Our comparison will be limited to the case of constant rela-
tive risk aversion and 6 =R=&=1.Even in this simple case, there is an
ambiguity.Observe from (7c) that with constant relative risk aversion
(q =0,a =1—y> 0), b =0;from (7b), we see that with R =8=1,
1
a =(1+(1_)a]Substituting these values of a and b into the expression
for (0), equation (11), and substituting the result into (20) yields the




To calculate the effect on private wealth of the introduction of private
annuities we subtract (48) from (44c) to obtain
** —= --{(1—p)a —(1+p—p2)) (49)
Observe that ** —W*has the same sign as the term in curly brackets. For
example, with logarithmic utility (a =1),the term in curly brackets is equal
to —p +p2< 0 so that ** < W*. There is some value of the coefficient of






< 1. (50b)— 32—
Tosummarize, we have shown that the introduction of private annuities
reduces the share of aggregate consumption consumed by the young cohort if
either of the following two conditions is met: (a) the utility function U(
exhibits constant relative risk aversion; or (b) 6 =R=6=1.The direction
of the effect of private annuities on the level of private wealth is harder to
determine. Even if we make both assumptions (a) and (b), the introduction of
private annuities can either increase or decrease private wealth, depending on
the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
VI. A Diagrammatic Presentation
In this section we present a simple diagrammatic illustration of the
effects of introducing social security and of introducing private annuities.
We limit our analysis to the case in which R =G=6=1.By restricting the
net return on capital and the population growth rate to equal zero, we essen-
tially remove any aggregate income effects associated with the introduction of
either actuarially fair social security or actuarially fair private annuities.
More precisely, if R =G=1,then steady state aggregate consumption is equal
to Y regardless of the level of actuarially fair social security (see equation
(31)) and regardless of the presence of actuarially fair private annuities
(see equations (44a,b)). In the case with K =6=6=1,there are particu-
larly sharp distinctions between the responses of individual behavior and of
aggregate behavior to various changes. For example, for an individual with a
given endowment, the introduction of social security will raise both first—
period and second—period consumption; however, the introduction of social
security has no effect on the (steady state) level of aggregate consumption of
either the young or the old. As another example, the introduction of private— 33—
annuitieshas an ambiguous effect on individual consumption behavior, but the
effect on aggregate consumption is unambiguous. The difference between the
analyses of individual effects and of aggregate effects is that the aggregate
analysis takes account of the endogenous adjustment of bequests. Although the
introduction of either social security or private annuities has a positive
income effect from the viewpoint of the individual, the endogenous adjustment
of bequests offsets any income effect in the aggregate analysis. The fact
that neither social security nor private annuities affects aggregate income
essentially imposes a zero income effect in the aggregate analysis.
First consider the introduction of social security as illustrated in fig-
ure 1.In the absence of social security or private annuities the
individual's budget line is given by II' which has a slope of —l and has
intercepts equal to B+Y. The consumer chooses point in the absence of
social security or private annuities. The dashed line JFB has slope equal to
—A =—l/(l—p).In the presence of actuarially fair social security, which
levies a tax of T on the young and pays a benefit S =ATto the old, the
consumer's budget line is DFG. Provided that the social security benefit S is
smaller than second—period consumption at E1, the consumer moves to a point
such as E2. The introduction of social security has a positive income effect
because S > T but has no substitution effect. The positive income effect
leads to an increase in first—period consumption and hence reduces the size of
the bequest if the consumer dies after one period. In the aggregate, the
negative income effect on subsequent generations resulting from the lower
bequests received by these generations exactly offsets the positive income
effect arising from the fact that S > T. Thus, C1* and C2 are invariant to









Nowconsider the introduction of private annuities which shifts the
budget line from JJ' to the dashed line JFB. The consumption point shifts
from E1 to E3.The income effect tends to increase consumption in both
periods whereas the substitution effect tends to decrease c1 and increase
c2.
The total effect on c2 is thus unambiguously positive but the effect onc1 is
ambiguous. In the presence of private annuities, all consumers will hold
their savings in the form of these annuities and there will be no bequests.
The elimination of bequests imposes a negative income effect on all subsequent
consumers except for type 0 consumers. In the aggregate, the negative effect
arising from the elimination of bequests exactly offsets the positive income
effect arising from the availability of private annuities as illustrated in
figure 1. Thus, in the aggregate, only the substitution effect is operative
so that aggregate first—period consumption falls and aggregate second—period
consumption rises.
From the analysis in this section it is clear that the distinction
between social security and private annuities is not that the claims to future
social security benefits are liabilities of the government and the claims to
future annuity payments are liabilities of private firms.Rather, the dis-
tinction is that the social security system we have examined is compulsory and
has a fixed level of participation whereas individuals can choose the amount
of privately marketed annuities to hold. As explained above, the compulsory
social security system has no substitution effect, i.e., it does not affect
the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation for an individual consumer.
Kowever, the introduction of a market for annuities allows the consumer to
choose the level of annuities in his portfolio, and hence affects the inter—
temporal marginal rate of transformation.— 35 —
VII.Cong ludina Remarks
We have developed an overlapping generations model with random lifetimes
which induce random intergenerational transfers in the form of bequests. This
model adds considerable richness to the standard overlapping generations
framework because it generates intra—cohort distributions of wealth and con-
sumption. Therefore, the model can be used to analyze the effect of policies
on the distribution of consumption and wealth within cohorts as well as the
effects on the aggregate consumption and wealth of each cohort.
The model developed in the paper has been used to analyze the effects on
wealth and consumption of changes in the level of actuarially fair social
security. We showed that increasing the level of social security reduces
national wealth (even if the social security system is fully funded) and uni-
formly narrows the distribution of consumption within each cohort. The reduc-
tion in national wealth leads to a decrease, an increase, or no change in the
steady state consumption of each cohort depending on whether the net rate of
return on capital is greater than, less than, or equal to the rate of popula-
tion growth.Appendix A
Proof of Lemma
Observe that Var (y) =Y f(y1—y)where a bar over a variable denotes
1=0











Therefore Var(y) —Var(x)=Cov(z,x+y). Since x1+y1 is nondecreasing in i
and z is nonincreasing in 1, Cov(z, x+y) < 0. Therefore Var(y) ( Var (x).
q.e.d.Appendix B
In this appendix we calculate the effect on the aggregate first—period
consumption of the generation born in period t*+m of the introduction in
period t*+1 of actuarially fair social security. That is, we derive equation
(40) in the text.
It will be useful to define x as
.'1_I ll =
Under actuarially fair social security, RT =(1—p)Sso that
(R2/G)(T+apS) =(R/G)(1—p+apR)S=((RIG)—px)S (B2)
Substituting (Bi) and (B2) into (39) yields
— = aStp—((RIG)—px]1x11 (B3)
As a step toward calculating the average value of each side of (B3), we
first calculate
•s—l
I (1_p)pJ I x =(l—p)i pl:1_ (B4)
j=0 i=0 j=0
X
Recallingthat j*= min(j,rn—i), (B4) can be rearranged to yield
j—l m-1 I(i_p)pi I x =
1—xtl—pI —Iix1] (B5)
j=0 i=0 j=0 jm
Calculating the sums on the right hand side of (B5) yieldsmm—i mm I=i:.utpx —'
I (B6) I(l_p)pJ i—p 1—px
j=O i=O
whichcan be simplified to yield
.j—l-1 P m—lrn—l I (i—p)p x = 1—px ). (B7)
l—px
j=O i=O







=aDS1—(RIG) +[(R/G)—pr]pxm-') (B9) Ci.+'i,t+m l-px
Recognizing that
rn—irn—i=(1—p(1_aR)Ip(i_aR)m-i(R/G)W (BlO) [(RIG)— px]pi
then yields equation (40) in the text.References
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